LIBERATION OF BANGLADESH
India was forced to intervene in Bangladesh due to the crackdown of the Pakistan army, the massacres and the streams of refugees that crossed into India.
West Pakistan, in 1961, had a population of some 43 million and East Pakistan, 51 million. In the elections held at the end of 1970, the Awami League got 160 seats (all but 2), in the east.
Bhutto’s People’s party in West Pakistan got 81 out of the 138 seats. Bhutto refused to accept Mujib-ur-Rehman as Prime Minister of Pakistan and ordered a secret reinforcement of East Pakistan via Sri Lanka.
On the 25th March 1971, Yahya Khan was in Dhaka and ordered the crackdown in Bangladesh and flew back to West Pakistan...
The crackdown, Operation Searchlight, commenced at 0100hrs on 26th March 1971. Mujib was arrested shortly after he had proclaimed an independent Republic. Dacca was soon brought under control.
Almost Simultaneously, Major Zia-ur-Rehman declared independence on the 27th of March, 1971.
Pakistan Army strength in East Pakistan
· 35 Infantry Battalions
· 6 Field Regiments
· Several heavy mortar and light anti-aircraft batteries
· One regiment of tanks( Chaffee)
· Mixed Squadron of Chaffees/PT-76
· Seven wings of Para-military
· Seven wings of East Pakistan civil armed forces
· Several thousand “Mujahids”
· Air Force – 25 Sabre Jets
· Navy – Several Gunboats and other craft.
East Bengal Units
· 5 battalions of East Bengal Rifles
East Bengal battalions withdrew to India by 15th March.
Indian Moves
Government of India deplored the crackdown and the large number of refugees streaming in. In the beginning of April 1971, Sam Manekshaw was ordered to move in.
Manekshaw phoned the author to move in immediately, to which he asked the aim. The author also explained the difficulties of the mountain divisions which were organized for mountain warfare and were deployed on the Chinese border.
There were no bridges and very limited transport. There were several wide tidal rivers. The monsoon was to break shortly and the Indian army would have got bogged down.
Manekshaw asked the author by what date he could move. The author replied, “not before 15th November, Contingent on us getting the necessary bridges and equipment. We hope that by 15th November, the ground would be sufficiently firm,”
Manekshaw phoned twice more goading us to move, saying that the bureaucrats were calling the army “cowards”.
To which the author retorted to tell them sarcastically that the “Eastern command were cowards”
The author then started formulating operational and logistical plans.
On April 29th 1971, Eastern Command was officially ordered to assist the Bangladeshi forces. Meanwhile in Mid April, Rustomji ( Head of the Border Security Force ), along with his staff visited the author at his residence, telling him that since the army did not want to move into Bangladesh, the Border Security Force would do so and that the army was invited to attend the victory parade in Dacca in approximately 2- 3 weeks.
The BSF moved in and we had to extricate them together the East Bengal Battalions. So much for the victory parade in Dacca!!
The BSF later played a major and important role in the liberation of Bangladesh.
BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE
End of March 1971, Taj-ud-din, Nazrul Islam and Colonel Usmani and Wing Commander Khondkar arrived, and were set up in a Bungalow in Calcutta on Theatre Road.
They wanted to hold a parliamentary meeting to work out a constitution. The author advised them that there were not enough MPs for that and the example he gave was to follow what that of General Charles De Gaulle and that they should issue a declaration of independence. .
The author helped them to subsequently draft this declaration.
The declaration of independence was announced just inside the East Pakistan border at Baidyanath Tala on the 17th of April 1971.
Shortly after, the defection of the Deputy High Commission of East Pakistan was arranged by the author.
Meanwhile, the decision was taken by the Indian government to help Mukti Bahini. This was later confirmed in the Indian Parliament on the 29th of July, 1971.
TERRAIN
The terrain is low-lying and intersected by numerous rivers, some as much as five miles wide. Roads and bridges are few. The alignment of the major rivers Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna divide the area into four independent sectors.
· North-Western Sector
Here the main communication center is at Bogra.
· The Western Sector
The control sectors are Jessore, Magura and Faridpur
· The North East Sector
Contains Dacca, which is the center of gravity and the geo-political and geo-strategic heart of East Pakistan.
· The South East Sector
Chandpur, Daudkandi and the Coronation Bridge on the river Meghna to control the approaches to Dacca from the east.
STRATEGY
PAKISTANI STRATEGY
We had appreciated that Pakistani main mission and aim would be to defend their territory, particularly the towns, and accordingly would commit most of their troops to defend their borders and their towns.
OUR STRATEGY
Based on the Pakistani strategy and deployment, the strategy that we formulated was based on the following parameters:
· Objectives
1. Final Objective – Dacca ( Centre of Gravity and political geo-strategic heart)
2. Subsidiary Objectives: command, control and communication centers in each of the sectors.
3. Thrust Lines - to be selected to isolate and bypass centers of resistance (earlier Indian Army generally moved along main roads with their logistic following. In order to bypass centers of resistance, we issued instructions that the axis of advance (thrust lines) would use subsidiary dirt tracks. The force should move self contained until the axis of maintenance for logistics was opened.
4. Preliminary operations were to be executed in order to draw troops to the border (somewhat similar strategy was used by the American forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom).
MUKTI BAHINI – OPERATION JACK-POT
The contribution of the Mukti Bahini was enormous. They and the East Bengal Battalions played a key role in the liberation of Bangladesh. Their operations completely demoralized the Pakistani army and created a hostile environment, lowering their morale.
The initial target set for the Mukti Bahini was a force of some
100,000 (70,000 guerillas and 30, 000 regulars).
Training for these guerillas was inadequate and was for only three weeks. Despite this, they were able to operate against the Pakistani army. The naval wing did excellent work particularly, the frogmen and divers. They sank 15 ships, 11 coasters, 7 gunboats, two tankers and 19 river-craft. They crippled the ports and the anchorages of Mangla port and that of Chittagong.
In May’71, the author completed the outline plan. Eastern Command had two corps, 4 and 33 each consisting of three divisions.
4 corps (2, 5 and 23 divisions) and 33 corps (17, 20 and 27 divisions). In addition 8 and 57 divisions were in Nagaland and Mizoram engaged in Counter-Insurgency operations.
To find troops for our offensive
We could pull out 17 and 23 divisions leaving 4 divisions to hold the Chinese border. Army Headquarters reserve, comprised 6 mountain division earmarked for the defense of for Bhutan. As Pakistani had approximately 4 divisions plus paramilitary, we needed at least 6-8 divisions to mount an offensive...
Army headquarters promised us 4 and 9 divisions which were employed in West Bengal at that time to counter the naxalite insurgency and also 340 Infantry brigade.
One Battalion group of 50 Para Brigade was allotted for the Para-drop.
PAKISTANI DEPLOYMENT
North West Sector
· 14 Infantry division - located in Nator (Major General Nazar Hussain)
· 23 Infantry Brigade (4 battalions) - located in Dinajpur – Rangpur
· 205 Infantry Brigade – located in Hilli- Goraghat
· 34 Infantry Brigade – located in Rajashahi – Noagaon
· Recce and support battalion – two squadrons of amour, two field regiments and heavy mortar batteries.
Western Sector
· 9 Infantry Division – located in Jessore ( Major General M.H. Ansari)
· 107 Infantry Brigade – located in Jessore
· 57 Infantry Brigade – located in Jhenida – Jibanagar
· Two field regiments, heavy mortar battery, one squadron Amour.
South Eastern Sector
· 14 Infantry division – located in Bhairah Bazaar ( Maj Gen Abdul Majid Quazi)
· 17 Infantry Brigade – located in Akhura – Bhraman Baria
· 313 Infantry Brigade – Maulvi Bazar
· 202 Infantry Brigade – Sylhet
· Two field regiments and heavy mortar batteries
· 39 Infantry division – Chandpur (Maj Gen Rahim Khan)
· 117 Infantry Brigade – Mynamati
· 53 Infantry Brigade ( 2 battalions) – located in Feni
· 91 Infantry Brigade (1 battalion + paramilitary) – located in Chittagong.
North Eastern Sector
· 36 Infantry Division – Dacca
· 93 Infantry Brigade - Dacca
· A mixed brigade – Dacca
· East Pakistan Civil Armed Police, Paramilitary etc
INDIAN OUTLINE PLAN
North West Sector:
· Troops – 20 mountain divisions and 340 Infantry Brigade.
· Objective – BOGRA. Exploit upto Brahmaputra
Western Sector
· Troops – 4 mountain and 9 Infantry divisions
· Objective – Jessore, Magura, Faridpur ( Contain Khulna)
· Opportunity – move to Dacca if condition suitable.
· Indian Waterway Transport, IWT to move to Farakka and down to Harding Bridge.
· No Corps headquarters existed and only started raising in HQ 2 corps in November 1971.
South Eastern Sector
· Troops – 23 divisions. 8 mountain division of two brigades, 57 division (8 and 57 divs had no artillery).
· Control Headquarters to be provided from elements of Headquarters 33 corps.
· Exploit if possible across the river Meghna.
North Eastern Sector
· Troops available – 95 Infantry Brigade (4 battalions). Need another division.
· Objective – Dacca
· Para drop 1 battalion group in Tangail on D plus 7.
· Support to be provided by Tiger Siddiqui at Tangail with his 20, 000 Mukti Bahini Force.
LOGISTICS
Without awaiting further orders from army headquarters, we started building logistics and the infrastructure. We planned for logistical support to cover operations for a period of 30 days.
· 33 corps – at Teliamura and Dharamnagar – 30,000 tons
· Roads and airstrips to be built, railway freight capacity to be enhanced.
· Hospitals, signal communications to be set-up.
· 2 corps (yet to be raised) – logistics at Krishnanagar in West Bengal. Two divisions. 14.000 tons
· 20 div – located in Raiganj, North Bengal. 7000 tons.
· Tura in Meghalaya – 4000 tons to cater for a division plus for Dacca.
· Rationalization of Artillery and induction of artillery from the Chinese border to make up deficiencies of artillery units of 8 and 57 divisions that were to operate in East Bengal.
· The Bridges were only released in late august. [Old World War II bridges in repairable state. These were repaired on priority.
MAPS
· We had very old maps of the area, over 50 years old, at the scale of one inch to 2 miles, which were of little or no use.
· We obtained the Pakistani maps, courtesy Mukti Bahini and due to shortage of time, had them reprinted as they were, by the Survey of India and issued to all troops in October ’71. We used the Pakistani maps for the campaign.
SIGNAL INTERCEPT
· We Persuaded Manekshaw to put the signal intercept units in the east directly under us. This was the only reliable source of information and enabled us to assess the complete Pakistan order of battle and also later, to intervene in the operations.
· Initially, we had to deal with two air force commands. We requested boundaries to be changed in order to deal only with one. We also requested for an advanced headquarters to be located at Fort Williams, Calcutta. This was sanctioned by Air Chief Marshall P.C.Lal
· The Inland Waterways flotillas were moved from Calcutta to Farakka and from Assam to Dubri, in June – July of 1971
· The logistical planning was thorough, with the result that once operation started; troops never had to look back. The campaign was successful largely due to the foresight and the detailed logistical planning.
ARMY HEADQUARTERS OPERATION INSTRUCTION
In the month of May, we sent the army headquarters an outline plan which based on the strategy that was envisioned by us.
In the beginning of August, Manekshaw and his Director- Military Operations, Maj Gen K.K.Singh arrived at Fort Williams Calcutta, to discuss the draft of their operation instruction.
Though, much what we had sent in May had been incorporated, the main centre of gravity and geo-political activity, Dacca, was totally omitted. It appeared; the mission and aim formulated by Manekshaw and given to Government was to take territory to house a government in exile. The territory was to include two primary objectives, what he called the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong.
Manekshaw’s assessment was that Dacca was not important but it was important to secure the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong, the main thrust he directed was to be weighted for the capture of Khulna.
The author objected strongly, stating that the center of gravity was Dacca and that Khulna was a minor river port some 30 miles away from our border, the main anchorage being at Mangla downstream. Further the terrain narrowed toward Khulna and was unsuitable for maneuver. Chittagong was peripheral and would have little bearing on the outcome of the war...
Heated exchanges followed. The author insisting on the capture of Dacca, saying that the entry ports were not relevant as there would be a naval blockade. Thus, Pakistan would have no access to the ports. Unfortunately Aurora who was overawed by Manekshaw agreed with whatever Manekshaw proposed.
The only change that Manekshaw agreed to was to cut out the word “main” from the thrust to Khulna.
The operation instruction was received by us as late as 11th August. We discussed the offensive with all our formations and held war-games before finalizing our plans to conform to our concept of the strategy, selection of objectives and the thrust lines to bypass centers of resistance. Our outline plan was as follows--
· 33 corps – objective Bogra – bypass Hilli, thrust line border Pirganj- Bogra. Lt Gen Aurora still favouring attacking Rangpur, Hilli and Dinajpur, which was opposed by the Corps and divisional commanders as also Chief of the Staff (the author).
· 2 corps – there were acrimonious exchanges, the corps commander wanted to move his two divisions close together as he was apprehensive of the flanks. We wanted 9 div to use the axis of Bayra ,Jessore, Faridpur, with a small element to contain Khulna.
· We planned for 4 mountain division to use axis Shikapur, Jhenida , Faridpur. Our plan was deliberately compromised by the corps launching preliminary operations in Bayra and Shikapur, thus ensuring the Corps Commander’s desire to move both the divisions close together could be implemented.
· 4 corps – The Corps Commander Lt Gen Sagat Singh wanted to capture the fortified Lalmai ridge, Comilla and Maynamati. Due to preliminary operations by 23 div in Belonia, we froze 23 div and ordered their axis to be Chaudagram, Laksham, Chandpur, bypassing enemy resistance.
· 57 div thrust line from Akhura to the river Meghna had to be changed as we found that the brigade that was guarding the Coronation Bridge moved to Sylhet, leaving the route to the river Meghna open.
· The 8th mountain division was to contain Sylhet with one Brigade while the other brigade was to be corps reserve.
· Thrust to Dacca – As Army Headquarters refused to give any troops for this thrust, we planned as follows:
· 95 Infantry Brigade (4 battalions), one independent battalion was suitably located. We moved three brigades down from the Chinese border without informing Sam Manekshaw, because Manekshaw always insisted that the Chinese would intervene. We discussed this with the Director Military Operations, Manekshaw was not informed
· The new Director Military Operations, Inder Gill, a very pragmatic and competent officer agreed to the author’s views that Dacca was essential and assisted him throughout in the planning. Together they planned an airdrop of a battalion group in October at Tangail, which was being held by Mukti Bahini. The drop was to take place on D plus 7 with link up in 24 hours.{ took place later as planned }
· Captain Ghosh of the Para Brigade moved in November with his layout party to Tangail to brief the Mukti Bahini regarding the air-drop with a request for Tiger Siddiqui and his 20, 000 Mukti Bahini force to assist in collecting the air drop and also to move with our troops to Dacca. Therefore, for the thrust to Dacca the plan was for 95 brigade group, the independent Bihar battalion under Brig Sant Singh , at least two brigades from the Chinese border ( Brigades 123, 167 and 5), together with the Para-battalion.
· The Para-Battalion was to drop at Tangail. The combined force was to advance to Dacca. Simultaneously, we felt that there should be a Maquis type uprising in Dacca [which never took place].
INDO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY
In a masterstroke, in august 1971, Mrs Gandhi initiated the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, which spelt out that there would be mutual consultations to remove any threat and to take appropriate measures to ensure peace and security of their countries. This virtually ensured that the Chinese would think twice before they would consider intervening on the side of Pakistan. This was given weightage by the author but ignored by Manekshaw
PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS
Due to Pakistani shelling of the border, the government permitted us to move in to a depth of10 miles, to silence Pakistani guns.
Preliminary operations commenced from 22nd November. We used this opportunity to secure jumping off places such as Bayra, Feni, Hilli etc. This also had the affect to draw Pakistani troops to the border.
The Army Commander, who was more involved with the Mukti Bahini and in touring, was not in the picture regarding our plan to capture Dacca and when informed, decided against our advice, to inform Manekshaw about the move down of the brigades from the Chinese border. Manekshaw, who was apprehensive of the Chinese intervening, responded sharply in a short signal, “I have nursed you better than any woman. Who told you to move these brigades down? You will move them back at once,”
He then ordered the brigades to go back to the Chinese border.
Lt Gen Aurora was completely shaken and the author firmly told him that he would sort the matter out.
The author spoke to Inder Gill, the Director Military Operation, who was furious regarding Aurora sending the signal to Manekshaw.
Gill agreed with the author that we would not move the brigades back and as we felt that the war would start soon. Gill assured the author that he would not inform Manekshaw but the author should not move them into Bangladesh without Army Headquarters’ clearance, as Manekshaw was unreasonably adamant on this point.
On the 6th of December, on the request of Inder Gill, the 123 Brigade was moved to the western front together with medium artillery and air defence artillery as well as T-54 tanks.
Despite repeated requests to Mankeshaw to use the other two brigades from the Chinese border once the war started, he only agreed to the employment as late as 8th December, 5 days after the war started, which seriously delayed our offensive to Dacca.
INTERCEPTS
We were getting intercepts between East and West Pakistan that help was coming to them from White from the South and Yellow from the North (USA and China). This was being sent to the Pakistani Commander Gen Niazi to encourage him to fight on.
On December 1, we intercepted wireless traffic warning all shipping and aircraft to stay away from Indian borders. We now knew that war was imminent.
On December 3, fishermen picked up wreckage from the Pakistani submarine Ghazi. A life belt marked Diablo, which was the earlier American name for the submarine, was also found floating.
The Ghazi blew up while laying mines outside Vizagapatam (now Vishakhapatam). Though later, the navy claimed to have sunk it.
WAR
At 1740 hours on 3 dec Pakistan bombed our air fields in the west. The attack was delayed by one day. It has been often asked ‘why’. Perhaps it was the adverse publicity that the military was receiving. They were being called nitwits and
Idiots. There were taunts that if general Yayha Khan did nothing he would be lynched. The international outcry thy expected against our preliminary operations did not materialize.
At 1800 hours Manekshaw phoned that since they bombed our airfields the war had officially started and Mrs. Gandhi, who was at Calcutta was to be informed.
Aurora went to inform Mrs. Gandhi and the author issued confirmatory orders and allocated sorties for air support. There was all round relief from our troops that the war had started.
PROGRESS OF OPERATIONS
2 CORPS
The operations went ahead as planned with some deviations. 9 Infantry Division moved too slowly. We moved elements of 50 Para Brigade to hasten the capture of Jessore. 9 division instead of moving to Magura diverted towards Khulna. Another deviation took place when a column of 4 Mountain was ambushed near Kushtia. The division over-reacted and diverted troops from their designated thrust line three days were then lost, The inland waterway flotilla reported to 2 Corps at the Hardinge Bridge on 5 December but the Corps Commander declined to employ them. They were moved to Dacca only on 17 december. The offensive was delayed and final objective Goalundo was reached on 15 December. The handling of 2 Corps was inept by the Corps and Divisional Commanders.
20 INFANTRY DIVISION
The Division bypassed Hilli via Pirganj and reached its objective Bogra on 15 December, bypassing Pakistani defenses in its thrust.
33 CORPS
The move of the Pakistani 311 infantry brigade to Sylhet
had not been anticipated by us. We had expected it to fall back to the Coronation Bridge to cover the approach to Dacca. It was a great blunder. 6 Pakistani battalions were now isolated in Sylhet.57 Mountain division changed its thrust line to reach the Meghna.
23 Infantry Division in a brilliant cross country move- Chaudagram- Laksham- Chandpur reached the river on 9 December 09
KILO FORCE
Since Manekshaw was insisting, we capture Chittagong we created Kilo Force comprising three battalions East Bengal Rifles one BSF battalion, one Central Police battalion, one mountain regiment, and two counter insurgent battalions from the Mizo hills, the Counter insurgency school provided the command structure.
We were told to employ the SSF Force. We gave them the task of capturing Rangamati.
ABORTIVE AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION –
COX’s BAZAAR – ROMEO FORCE
On 9th December, Manekshaw phoned the author telling him to launch an amphibious operation immediately on Cox’s Bazaar, the troops to embark on the 11th of December.
The reason he gave was that the Pakistani Army was going to withdraw to Burma through the Arakan.
The author told him that there were hardly any troops located in Chittagong to withdraw.
Further, we neither had the troops or the landing craft to launch such an operation (the author had taken part in several assault landings along the Arakan coast during World War II and he was familiar with the coast and the planning and equipment that was necessary to launch any such operation.
He pointed this out to Manekshaw emphatically. When asked about how to move the force, he told the author that it was the author’s responsibility, and that he would send two naval officers to discuss with him.
There was a merchant ship Vishwa Vijay that had just unloaded its cargo and the author gave instructions for it to be commandeered. In the meanwhile, the author pulled out a battalion plus two companies from the operation in Bangladesh and moved the headquarters of an artillery brigade, to command the force.
When the naval officers arrived the next day to discuss the plan, the author impressed on them that the troops that were being employed had never been to sea, that they were no life-belts nor scrambling nets, and that the merchant ship that was to carry them and transfer them to the rendezvous with the naval landing craft, several hundred miles away, was a complex operation.
The author told the naval officers that it was not possible to land in the middle of a town and that the said landing should take place on Ukhia beach, south of Cox’s Bazaar, which the author knew very well and had trained there for amphibious operations during World War II.
The beach was gently sloping and there were several runnels. The navy should beach the landing craft at low tide so the troops could disembark, dry-shod and re-float landing craft at high-tide.
The navy agreed to the above proposal.
With great difficulty, the force sailed on 14th December and was transferred to the landing craft at sea, namely INS GILDHAR and GHARIAL.
The Navy changed the plan, put the troops in rowing boats and landed them on a runnel, where several of them drowned. Fortunately, there was no enemy in sight but a Mukti Bahini camp, nearby.
Amphibious operations require specialized training, equipment and detailed planning. None of these parameters existed.
The cavalier attitude and orders issued by the then Indian Army and Naval Chiefs of Staff, showed a complete lack of military knowledge.
We were fortunate to get off so lightly.
OPERATIONS FOR THE CAPTURE OF DACCA
The force under headquarters 101 Communication Zone.
Troops – 95 brigade of 4 battalions, mountain regiment, Bihar regiment, Mukti Bahini. The employment of 167 and 5 mountain brigade that had moved from the Chinese border was held back by Mankeshaw until 8th December.
The para-drop on Tangail (D plus 7 on 11th December) was successful and the link-up took place as planned.
Tiger Siddiqui from Mukti Bahini helped in retrieving stores of the para-drop but did nothing to attack the retreating Pakistanis. He did not move with our troops to Dacca and only arrived there after the ceasefire, on the 16th December.
On December 13, our troops, some 3000, reached the outskirts of Dacca.
AMERICAN AND CHINESE MOVES
Manekshaw was obsessed with the fear that the Chinese would intervene. We had seen no movement in the Tibetan Plateau and informed the same to him accordingly. Perhaps, he gave credence to the intercepts we sent him from West to East Pakistan that they were going to get help from Yellow in the North (China) and White from the South (America).
Niazi was told to wait their arrival and to fight on. Meanwhile, American task force, comprising the Aircraft Carrier Enterprise and amphibious assault ship, 4 guided missile ships, frigates and landing craft entered the Straits of Malacca on the night of 13/14 December. There was consternation in Delhi as they felt that the Americans were intending to evacuate their nationals from Dacca.
The author explained that this was not possible and incorrect as the Americans were flown out from Dacca on 12th December by three R.A.F and one UN C-130 aircraft.
POLITICAL – UNITED NATIONS
There was a Soviet resolution on 5/7 December for a political settlement which was rejected by Pakistan. In the Hamdoodur Rehman Report, Bhutto was criticized for not accepting the resolution that would have saved the Pakistani Army.
On 6th December, Bush Sr accused India of aggression and called for a ceasefire. The resolution was vetoed by Russia.
On 8th December, India officially recognized Bangladesh. This was followed by an Argentine resolution in the General Assembly for a ceasefire and withdrawal. It was passed by a 104 votes to 11 against, with 10 abstentions.
On 13th December, an American resolution on similar lines was vetoed by the Soviets. The Soviets then informed us that they will not veto anymore.
There were reverberations in Delhi and some degree of Panic.
Manekshaw then sent us an order which he copied to all the corps, ordering us to capture every single town in Bangladesh, with the exception of Dacca.
We were on the outskirts of Dacca. If the order was implemented, it would have meant going back to carry out abortive attacks on well-defended towns.
The author phoned the Corps Commanders to ignore the order and carry on as before.
General Aurora was in a panic and told the author that it was all his fault that they had not captured any towns and that the author’s strategies and plans were responsible for the existing situation.
The author then spoke to General Niazi of Pakistan through a wireless link, offering him attractive terms of surrender.
On 14th December, we received an intercept that they were going to be a high level meeting in Government House in Dacca. We bombed the Government House. The Governor resigned and moved to the Intercontinental Hotel.
On the 14th Yahya Khan, the Pakistani Commander in Chief sent a message to Niazi to try to stop the fighting and to go for a ceasefire. There was no mention of any surrender.
That evening General Niazi, Major General Farman Ali went to see the American Consul General Spivack with the following terms to be conveyed to us:
1) Ceasefire and end to all hostilities
2) Handover administration to the United Nations
3) The United Nations were to ensure :
a) Safety of all personnel, military, paramilitary and repatriation to West Pakistan.
b) Safety of West Pakistan civilians pending their return to West Pakistan from East Pakistan.
c) Safety of all non-locals settled in East Pakistan.
d) No reprisals.
The author was informed of this by a contact in the UK High Commission. The ceasefire proposal was sent to Islamabad and then to Washington and was handed over on the 15th of December to Bhutto in New York, at the United Nations.
Bhutto refused to accept it, saying that there is no question of a ceasefire and he would attend the UN meeting discussing the Polish resolution scheduled for that night.
The Americans handed over Niazi’s proposal to the Indians in Delhi on the 15th and the ceasefire was agreed to, from1700 hrs 15 December to 0900 hrs on 16th December, which was extended indefinitely
On the 15th night (16th morning-India time), The UN Polish resolution calling for ceasefire and withdrawal (Poland was a part of the Soviet Bloc).
Bhutto tore it up in a huff and stormed out of the chamber demanding that India be branded as an aggressor.
SURRENDER
On the morning of December 16, around 0915 hrs, Manekshaw phoned the author and said, “Go and get a surrender.” To which the author retorted that he had already sent him a draft surrender document, three days ago and whether the author should negotiate on that.
At that point, Manekshaw cut the author short and said, “You know what to do. Just go,”
The author casually mentioned that in his conversations with Niazi, he had invited the author for lunch.
Accompanied by a staff officer and carrying his draft of the surrender document, the author proceeded to Dacca changing helicopters at Jessore.
At Jessore, a communication was delivered to him, telling him that the Government of India had approved of the author having lunch with General Niazi, yet there was no confirmation of the terms of surrender that the author had sent to Delhi.
When the author landed at Dacca, he was met by representatives of the United Nations who offered to accompany him to arrange the withdrawal of the Pakistani Army and the taking over of the Government of East Pakistan.
The author thanked them for their consideration but regretted their kind offer.
Intense fighting was going on between Mukti Bahini and the Pakistani army. The author drove through Dacca in a Pakistani army car, accompanied by Niazi’s Chief of Staff.
The Mukti Bahini forces fired at the car and bringing it to a halt. The author talked them into allowing to proceed, saying that the Pakistani Army was surrendering and that their independent government would be in place the very next day. The Mukti Bahini wanted to shoot the Pakistani Chief of Staff, but was persuaded not to do so and reluctantly allowing the vehicle to proceed.
On arrival at Niazi’s headquarters, his staff officer read out the instrument of Surrender to Niazi.
Niazi responded negatively, saying that he had only agreed to a ceasefire and withdrawal under the UN, and that there was no question of an unconditional surrender, as spelt out in the draft document.
Further, there was no question of surrendering to a joint command that included Bangladesh forces. The author then responded that it was not worded as an unconditional surrender as there were guarantees for the lives of all army personnel and their families and ethnic minorities. And that they would be treated with consideration as soldiers under the provisions of Geneva Convention.
These clauses are not found in any other surrender document.
Niazi and his Generals then stated that the author had only come to discuss a cease-fire and not surrender.
Further acrimonious discussions took place, his Generals intervening as well.
Incidentally, Niazi had told the author that he had 30,000 troops in Dacca, whereas the Indian forces outside Dacca numbered a mere 3000.
The author then informed them that he could not give them any better terms, than what was given in the draft surrender document. And that, if they surrendered, he would ensure the protection of armed forces, paramilitary and ethnic minorities, as well as Pakistani civilians.
However, if Niazi declined, then the author obviously could not guarantee their safety. The author further informed then that if the terms of the surrender were not accepted, then he would have no option but to order the resumption of hostilities.
The author then said that he would give Niazi and his men thirty minutes to consider and walked out. The author was very apprehensive of the situation as Niazi had some 30,000 troops and the Indian army only 3000.
Niazi could have fought on for at least two-three weeks more. Also the UN was in session (Polish resolution) and would almost certainly intervene.
If Niazi refused, there was nothing that the author could have done.
Meanwhile, the Army Commander and his entourage were bringing a document which was to be signed at Dacca.
The author returned after thirty minutes and asked Niazi whether he accepted the document. Niazi did not answer and had tears in his eyes.
The author asked him three times if he accepted the terms of surrender, there wasn’t any answer.
There was dead silence all around. The author then picked up the document, held it high and said, “I TAKE IT AS ACCEPTED,”
The author then informed Niazi that he would have to surrender in public, in front of the people of Dacca in the Race Course.
In addition, he would have to provide an Honor Guard.
Then Niazi invited the author for lunch.
Gavin Young of the British newspaper, The Observer, also tagged on. Young got an award for exemplary journalism for his article entitled, The Surrender Lunch.
The atmosphere was unreal. The Pakistani officers chatting away. Silver was laid out as for a proper peacetime function.
The author and his Staff Officer stayed on one side and did not partake of the lunch.
A ceasefire had been converted into a SURRENDER, to the surprise of the Americans and others.
The author then proceeded to the airport with Niazi in his car to receive Aurora and his entourage. Enroute, Mukti Bahini jumped onto the car, wanted to kill Niazi.
The guerrillas were dissuaded from doing so by the author, and were told that Niazi was going to sign the surrender document.
They allowed the author to proceed.
Meanwhile, some elements of the Indian army started entering Dacca. Fortunately, a jeep containing two Para-troopers appeared to be lost and the author asked them to follow him.
This was most providential.
On arrival at the airport, Tiger Siddiqui with a truckload of Mukti Bahini guerrillas turned up. The author was extremely apprehensive that they wanted to shoot Niazi.
He therefore ordered the two Para-troopers to cover Niazi and point their rifles at Siddiqui.
He then ordered Siddiqui off the airport. Siddiqui angrily moved off.
About 1630 hrs the entourage of the Army Commander landed in Dacca and proceeded to the Race Course, inspecting the Honour Guard and thereafter signing the Instrument of Surrender.
The author was surprised when glancing at the document that was being signed, noticing that there were some errors.
This document was later retyped and resigned in Calcutta, some two weeks later, when Niazi was in transit to a Prisoner of War Camp.
After the document was signed, the Bangladeshi spectators rushed to Niazi, shouting that they would lynch him.
We had very few troops there and found it difficult to put him in an Indian army vehicle and drive him off.
We then proceeded to the airport to return to India.
In retrospect, looking back….
A CEASEFIRE HAD BEEN CONVERTED INTO A SURRENDER AND SIGNED IN SOME FOUR HOURS.
IT WAS THE ONLY PUBLIC SURRENDER IN HISTORY.
RESULTS
As a result of the campaign, a new country Bangladesh was born.
· 150,000 sq kms of territory was liberated.
· The Indian army took 93,000 prisoners.
· Pakistani casualties were - some 8000 killed.
· Indian casualties were 1421 killed, 4058 wounded.
· The superiority of our forces to the Pakistani was only
1.8 to 1(normally for an offensive, a superiority of 3 to 1,is aimed at).
LESSONS
· Aim/Mission - In any campaign, the mission or aim must be clearly spelt out. In this campaign, at Service Headquarters in Delhi, both the mission and the aim were not clearly spelt out and were in fact nebulous. The Army Headquarters’ aim was to take territory to include what they called the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong. Dacca was not on their agenda.
· Strategy - was not taught at any military institution in India at that time.
The Service Headquarters in Delhi was unable to formulate a comprehensive strategy.
· Intelligence - intelligence from the start was inadequate. Later with the deployment of the signal intercept unit, we were able to establish the Pakistani order of battle and also to take pre-emptive action, as operations proceeded.
· Planning – one can only do detailed planning upto a certain stage. Events on the battle field will dictate further progress. What is of paramount importance is flexibility, mobility and the ability to anticipate and not be overtaken by events.
. No operation can be successfully conducted without proper logistical backing. The success of operations in Bangladesh was largely due to sound logistical foresight and planning.
· Co-operation between the three Services (Army, Navy, Air Force) – This was almost non existent in Delhi. The Army and Air Force Chiefs were not on speaking terms. Fortunately at Command level, there was co-operation and camaraderie between the three Services.
· Amphibious Operations – There was no infrastructure or importance given to amphibious operations. Such operations require specialized equipment, intelligence and training, as well as detailed planning. None of these parameters obtained in 1971, resulting in abortive landings near Cox’s Bazaar.
· Media – International Support – International support is extremely important. Initially, the international media coverage was not supportive. However, with the progress of time, they appreciated the problems and were supportive of our efforts, particularly journalists Sydney Schanberg of The New York Times and Nick Tomalin, who was later killed in the Golan, as always reporting from the front. Also Tony Clifton of News Week, Gavin Young of The Observer and many others. Their support was most invaluable.
·
· GUTS and DETERMINATION - are of paramount importance. Niazi had the ability to fight on and obtain an honorable withdrawal; instead, he caved in and surrendered, though he had the ability to fight on for several weeks. He was taken to task for this when he returned to Pakistan.
On the other hand Mrs Indira Gandhi displayed determination and courage throughout. She stood up to Nixon and the United Nations. The victory in Bangladesh was Indira Gandhi's finest hour.
· Finally, Luck plays a very important role. We were extremely lucky, in the circumstances to be able to convert a ceasefire into an unconditional surrender.
To quote Arthur Wellesley, the Duke of Wellington’s comment, after the Battle of Waterloo,
“IT WAS INDEED A VERY CLOSE RUN THING,”
Lt General J.F.R Jacob
jfrjacob@hotmail.com